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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 25, 1789, the First Congress of the United States put 
forth a set of constitutional amendments, ten of which would later become 
the Bill of Rights.
1
  The first of these amendments states, ―Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .‖2  In subsequent 
caselaw, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied this prohibition to the federal 
government, as well as state governments through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
3
  Although this appears to be a simple standard to follow, history has 
proven otherwise, and the deviations taken have been the subject of much 
debate. 
This historic back-and-forth amongst scholars and legislators alike has 
led to a new battleground which tests the force behind Edward Beecher‘s 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2009); B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Pennsylvania 
State University (2003).  The author would like to thank the staff members of Pierce Law Review for 
their assistance in preparing this note for publication.  He would also like to thank his fiancée Weina 
for her support throughout the many hours devoted to completing this note. 
 1. NAT‘L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990) (stating the Free Exercise Clause 
is applicable to the states). 
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prescient statement, that ―[w]e are more especially called upon to maintain 
the principles of free discussion in the case of unpopular sentiments or 
persons, as in no other case will any effort to maintain them be needed.‖4  
Recently, a pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church by the name of Frede-
rick Waldron Phelps has pushed the limits of free speech by gathering 
members of his congregation near military funerals to chant and display 
slogans that many people would likely find highly offensive.
5
 
This note will begin by reviewing the events that led to the filing of 
Snyder v. Phelps
6
 and the subsequent jury verdict for the plaintiff, followed 
by Maryland‘s law prohibiting funeral protests.  Next, it will compare and 
contrast the current case with previous decisions that have examined how 
free speech and the free exercise of religion are affected by personal torts 
and governmental bans on certain types of behavior.  The note will con-
clude by examining whether the jury‘s decision was appropriate consider-
ing both the elements of the tort claims raised, and how the decision could 
affect the future of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
II.  A SUMMARY OF SNYDER V. PHELPS 
On March 10, 2006, plaintiff Albert Snyder and his family assembled 
at St. John‘s Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland to inter Albert‘s 
twenty-year-old son Matt, who was killed in the line of duty in Iraq while 
serving as a Lance Corporal in the Marine Corps.
7
 
During the funeral, Phelps and some members of his congregation 
from the Westboro Baptist Church decided to use the event, as they had 
done several times previously, to further their anti-homosexual agenda.
8
  
The Church‘s rationale for choosing military funerals as a place of protest 
is perhaps best expressed by its mantra: ―They turned America over to 
fags; they‘re coming home in body bags.‖9  This message is typically con-
veyed through shouting and hand-held signs; the signs displayed at the 
Snyder funeral included a variety of statements: ―God hates you,‖ ―You‘re 
going to hell,‖ ―Fag troops,‖ and ―Thank God for dead soldiers.‖10  Along 
with the protests at the funeral, Phelps added content to his website stating 
that Matt‘s parents ―raised him for the devil‖ and supported ―satanic Ca-
  
 4. Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 210 (D. Mass. 1986). 
 5. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008). 
 6. Id. at 567. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 571–72. 
 9. Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church, ADL.ORG, 
http://www.adl.org/special_reports/wbc/wbc_on_america.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). 
 10. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
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tholicism.‖11  The church members, however, ―complied with local ordin-
ances and police directions with respect to being a certain distance from 
the church,‖ and Snyder did not actually see the protests until viewing 
them on television later that day.
12
 
Following the demonstration, Phelps‘s daughter and follower, Shirley 
L. Phelps-Roper, published what she described as an ―epic,‖ titled ―The 
Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.‖13  This was displayed on 
the Church‘s website, and later encountered by Snyder following an Inter-
net search.
14
  Among other statements, the ―epic‖ claimed that Matthew‘s 
parents ―taught [him] to defy his creator,‖ and ―raised him for the devil.‖15 
Less than three months later, Snyder filed a complaint against Phelps 
and the Westboro Baptist Church—along with his daughters and John and 
Jane Does representing unknown protestors—in federal court in Mary-
land.
16
  The suit raised several claims: defamation, invasion of privacy 
based on both intrusion upon seclusion and publicity given to private life, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.
17
  Snyder 
claimed that his physical and emotional damages resulted from conduct so 
outrageous that punitive damages would be appropriate.
18
 
Phelps initially countered with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on jurisdictional and service 
challenges as well as failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.
19
  Other than the jurisdictional elements, the crux of Phelps‘s ar-
gument was that his behavior was protected by the interpretation of the 
First Amendment set forth in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.
20
  After deny-
ing the jurisdictional and service challenges, Judge Bennett pointed out the 
flaw in Phelps‘s reliance on Hustler, namely that Matt Snyder was not of 





 11. Complaint at 5, Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (No. 1:06-cv-
01389-RDB). 
 12. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Complaint at 2, Snyder II (No. 1:06-cv-01389-RDB). 
 17. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 18. Complaint at 9, Snyder II (No. 1:06-cv-01389-RDB). 
 19. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder I), No. 1:06-cv-01389-RDB, 2006 WL 3081106, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 
30, 2006). 
 20. Defendants‘ Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting Their Motion to Dismiss at 12–
13, Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (No. 1:06-cv-01389-RDB); see 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 21. Snyder I, 2006 WL 3081106, at *9. 
 22. Id. at *11. 
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The court granted the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment on 
the defamation and publicity given to private life claims, but the defen-
dants‘ other summary judgment arguments failed.23  On October 31, 2007, 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Snyder in the amount of $10.9 mil-
lion, consisting of $2.9 million in compensatory damages, $6 million in 
punitive damages relating to the invasion of privacy claim, and $2 million 




On February 4, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the District of Mary-
land issued a memorandum opinion denying the post-trial motions filed by 
Phelps, the Westboro Baptist Church, and two of Phelps‘s daughters.25  
However, the punitive damages awarded to Snyder were reduced from $8 
million to $2.1 million,
26
 due in part to the financial aid that Snyder re-
ceived for litigation costs
27




III.  MARYLAND STATUTORY LAW PROHIBITING PROTESTS AT FUNERALS 
Although Phelps engineered this particular protest to comply with 
Maryland law regulating protests at funerals,
29
 it is enlightening to consider 
the state‘s legislative response to this activity, especially when deciding 
whether the conduct is of such an egregious nature as to fall outside First 
Amendment protections. 
Maryland followed the lead of the federal government
30—as well as 
many other states—and enacted, effective October 1, 2006, a statute to 
  
 23. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572–73 (D. Md. 2008). 
 24. Id. at 573. 
 25. Id. at 570. 
 26.  Id. at 595. 
 27.  Id. at 593. 
 28. Id. at 595. 
 29. Id. at 572. 
 30. See generally Respect for America‘s Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat. 387 
(2006) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 38 U.S.C.).  The provisions of the Respect for 
America‘s Fallen Heroes Act provide that any disruptive demonstration within 150 feet of any ―road, 
pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from‖ national cemetery property—or within 300 feet of 
national cemetery property that would ―impede the access to‖ the property—are illegal, unless there is 
prior approval by ―the cemetery superintendent or the director of the property on which the cemetery is 
located.‖  Id.  However, this law only applies to demonstrations occurring between the ―period begin-
ning 60 minutes before and ending 60 minutes after a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.‖  Id.  
The act imposes fines and up to one year in prison for violators.  Id.  The general outrage at funeral 
protesting was reflected in the unanimous vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to 
pass the bill on May 24, 2006, representing a rare bipartisan allegiance against this particular form of 
expression.  Rebecca Bland, Note, The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act: Conflicting Interests 
Raise Hell with the First Amendment, 75 UMKC L. REV. 523, 530 (2006).  The President signed the 
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prevent the same types of funeral protests that Phelps had notoriously 
staged across the country.
31
  Unlike the federal statute, Maryland chose to 
direct its prohibition towards ―speech to a person attending a funeral, buri-
al, memorial service, or funeral procession that is likely to incite or pro-
duce an imminent breach of the peace.‖32  This provision was modeled 
very closely to the ―fighting words‖ exception from Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire: words ―which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.‖33 
The statute also implemented a buffer zone applying to areas ―within 
100 feet of a funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession,‖34 
significantly smaller than the 150- to 300-foot zone defined in the Federal 
Respect for America‘s Fallen Heroes Act.  This 100-foot zone—like the 






represents the minimum buffer zone imposed by states attempting to pre-
vent disruptions at funerals.
38
  A more far-reaching version of the ordin-
ance can be observed in Montana, where the prohibition extends to 1,500 
feet.
39
  Thus, Maryland appears more sensitive to the impact that the statute 
may have on areas surrounding cemeteries. 
Furthermore, the consequences of violating the Maryland statute—
imprisonment not exceeding ninety days or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or 
both—are substantially less than the federal statutory penalties of possible 
imprisonment of one year or a $100,000 fine.
40
 
Although in this case Phelps maintained a distance in excess of one 
hundred feet from the funeral, questions were raised at trial as to whether 
he also complied with the regulation against the use of ―fighting words.‖41  
The court also faced the question of whether compliance with the statute 




bill into law five days later before giving an emotional Memorial Day speech in support of the sacrific-
es made by troops overseas.  Id. 
 31. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 32. Id. § 10-205(b). 
 33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 34. CRIM. LAW § 10-205(c). 
 35.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-108 (2006). 
 36.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (Gould 2007). 
 37.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (2006). 
 38. Robert F. McCarthy, Note, The Incompatibility of Free Speech and Funerals: A Grayned-Based 
Approach for Funeral Protest Statutes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1469, 1487 (2007). 
 39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007). 
 40. CRIM. LAW § 10-205(d). 
 41. See Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008). 
 42. Id. at 576. 
File: 05-Dorsky-Pub-Final.doc Created on:  4/27/2009 4:07:00 PM Last Printed: 5/8/2009 10:49:00 AM 
240 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 2 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF SNYDER V. PHELPS 
Phelps and his codefendants based their defense primarily on the idea 
that their actions were absolutely protected by the First Amendment—both 
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
43
  However, over a 
century of caselaw has made clear that the First Amendment guarantees are 
far from absolute.
44
  This case implicates the question of where the line 
concerning that protection should be drawn. 
A.  The Effect of Statutory Compliance 
1.  Limitations on Free Speech 
Phelps believed that because he informed the police prior to arriving at 
the funeral and followed the Maryland statute‘s buffer zone requirements, 
he was legally entitled to act out his religious beliefs in any fashion he 
deemed appropriate.  However, to carry this conclusion to its logical end, it 
is possible to see why this cannot be: under his theory, screaming graphic 
obscenities at the top of their lungs,
45
 repeatedly challenging every elderly 
person present to a fight,
46
 and threatening to blow up the attendees‘ cars 
as they exited the cemetery
47
 would all be valid and legal exercises of free 
speech, without any recourse available to law enforcement officials or 
those targeted by the protesters.  Compliance with certain statutory provi-
sions ensured that Phelps and his followers would not be criminally 
charged under those provisions, but it did not ensure that he was complete-
ly free from any kind of liability. 
One particularly egregious miscalculation on the part of Phelps‘s fol-
lowers was the decision to include signs and chants aimed directly at the 
family of Matthew Snyder—as opposed to the rest of their material, which 
was directed towards U.S. government policy and homosexuality in gener-
al.
48
  By doing this, in light of the circumstances, they opened themselves 
up to the possibility that their actions would be considered ―fighting 
words‖ due to their likelihood to ―inflict injury or [tendency] to incite an 
  
 43. Id. 
 44.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 75859 (1985). 
 45. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (excluding obscenity from First 
Amendment protection). 
 46. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568–72 (1942) (prohibiting fighting 
words from First Amendment protection). 
 47. See generally Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (prohibiting imminent threats from 
First Amendment protection). 
 48. See Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008). 
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immediate breach of the peace.‖49  In fact, this is the precise type of con-
duct that the Maryland statute is aimed at eliminating,
50
 and whether the 
conduct rose to that level is an issue of fact that should be left to a jury to 
resolve. 
2. Limitations on Free Exercise 
Phelps argued further, however, that his speech was an expression of 
his beliefs, and that statutes or other laws prohibiting or interfering with 
such expression are per se unconstitutional.
51
  His argument was based on a 
misunderstanding of the law.  What is prohibited is not the language itself, 
but the unprotected features of the words.  As stated by Justice Scalia: 
[T]he exclusion of ―fighting words‖ from the scope of the First 
Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, 
the unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal cha-
racter, essentially a ―nonspeech‖ element of communication.  
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, 
as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a ―mode of speech,‖ both can be 
used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim 
upon the First Amendment.  As with the sound truck, however, so 
also with fighting words: The government may not regulate use 




Thus if the words of the church members served as a basis for defamation, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, no 
shelter in the form of First Amendment protection can be found for the 
offensive nonspeech elements. 
The same erroneous reasoning on the part of the defendants also led 
them to the mistaken belief that the Free Exercise Clause provides them 
with effective immunity from lawsuits.
53
  As discussed above, the govern-
ment may certainly enforce laws for the public good that incidentally pro-
hibit the actions of certain religious groups.
54
  This principle has been out-
lined in Employment Division v. Smith: 
We have never held that an individual‘s religious beliefs excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting con-
  
 49. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 50. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
 51. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
 52. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (internal citation omitted). 
 53. See Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
 54. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
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duct that the State is free to regulate.  On the contrary, the record 
of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contra-
dicts that proposition.  As described succinctly by Justice Frank-
furter . . . : ―Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the 
long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from 
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restric-
tion of religious beliefs.  The mere possession of religious convic-
tions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society 
does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political respon-
sibilities . . . .‖55 
The Court also recognized the impact this necessarily has on the free 
exercise of religious beliefs by certain groups; however, it decided that 
such concerns are clearly outweighed by the need to protect the public at 
large: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in 
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 




The practices of Phelps‘s church would certainly qualify as those ―not 
widely engaged in,‖ and the above-quoted decision makes clear that al-
though his constitutional right to exercise his religious beliefs is signifi-
cant, it is simply not more important than the protection of the society as a 
whole. 
3.  The Content of Phelps’s Speech 
Phelps‘s main contention regarding the invalidity of the claims against 
him—as well as the statute itself—rests on the belief that it is the content 
of his speech that is being targeted.
57
  However, the court disagreed.
58
  
Phelps and his congregation describe themselves as Baptists, and their be-
lief system can be summed up in his own words: ―our goal is to preach the 
Word of God to this crooked and perverse generation.  By our words, some 
  
 55. Id. at 878–79 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 
(1940)). 
 56. Id. at 890. 
 57. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 
 58. Id. at 576–80. 
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will repent.  By our words, some will be condemned.  Whether they hear, 
or whether they forbear, they will know a prophet has been among them. . . 
.‖59  Noticeably absent from their stated purpose or the Bible itself is any 
religious requirement to attend and be active in protests at military funer-
als.  In fact, the church members ―essentially acknowledged in their testi-
mony that their choice of military funerals was driven by the publicity the 
demonstrations generated.‖60  Although courts should be hesitant to chal-
lenge the sincerity of a religious group‘s practices, the Westboro Baptist 
Church has acknowledged that its choice of venue was not driven by reli-
gious purposes, but rather by the desire to be noticed.  Thus in this case, it 
is not the content of the message that is being targeted, but rather the 
means by which the message is being promulgated. 
B.  The Tort of “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” 
1. The Elements of “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” in 
Maryland 
Regardless of Phelps‘s arguments, the ―intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress‖ claim appears to have been correctly balanced against 
Phelps‘s First Amendment rights.  This action has been recognized as a tort 
in Maryland as far back as 1977.
61
  Since that time, the courts have chosen 
to expand on the Restatement‘s definition and follow the standard articu-
lated in Womack v. Eldridge, which stated that the following elements 
must be proven to establish a prima facie case: 
(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; 
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; 
(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful con-
duct and the emotional distress; [and] 
(4) The emotional distress must be severe.
62
 
There is no specified ―time‖ or ―immediacy‖ element, only the need 
for a causal connection.  Therefore it does not matter whether Snyder wit-
nessed the actions of Phelps and his followers firsthand, as long as those 
actions caused his emotional injuries.  Furthermore, intent is not necessary 
  
 59. Lauren M. Miller, A Funeral for Free Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral 
Picketing Acts, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2007). 
 60. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
 61. Jones v. Harris, 371 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). 
 62. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (summarizing the rule stated in Womack v. 
Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)). 
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if the conduct is found to be reckless.  Thus even if Phelps did not intend 
for Snyder to be harmed in any way, if the jury found his conduct to be 
reckless, he could still be found liable. 
2. “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” v. The First Amend-
ment 
The Supreme Court in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., when 
faced with an ordinance establishing a buffer zone around an abortion clin-
ic, stated that any burden on free speech must be considered in light of the 
governmental interest at stake.
63
  The government certainly has an interest 
in protecting its citizens from injury, even if that injury is not physical in 
nature.
64
  In this case, the remaining analysis was appropriate for a jury, 
since there were several genuine issues of material fact: whether the ac-
tions of Phelps‘s and his followers were intentional or reckless, whether 
they were extreme and outrageous, whether there was a causal connection 
between the acts and Snyder‘s injuries, and whether Snyder‘s injuries were 
severe. 
Phelps‘s reliance on Hustler for the proposition that Snyder ―may not 
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . with-
out showing . . . that the publication contains a false statement of fact 
which was made with ‗actual malice‘‖65 is misplaced.  That case specifical-
ly dealt with an undisputed ―public figure‖: Falwell was host of a national-
ly syndicated television show and was the founder and president of a polit-
ical organization, as well as the author of several books and publications.
66
  
Hustler applied the approach from the Court‘s prior decision in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.—expanding on the holding of New York Times v. Sulli-
van—which stated that public figures include both persons who have 
achieved persuasive fame or notoriety and persons who voluntarily inject 
themselves into a central role in a particular public controversy.
67
  Snyder‘s 
son, however, was not a public figure until Phelps made him so through his 
protests.  Furthermore, the contention that Snyder‘s son was a public figure 
due to publication of his death and funeral information in the obituary sec-
tion of the newspaper, if sustained, would completely destroy the doctrine 
of ―public figure.‖  Benjamin Franklin once famously stated, ―Nothing is 
  
 63. Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994). 
 64.  See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 5152 (1988). 
 65. Id. at 56. 
 66. Id. at 57 n.5. 
 67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
292 (1964). 
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certain in life except death and taxes‖68—if the notice of one‘s death alone 
makes him a public figure, then everyone in the world could fall into that 
special category simply by passing away. 
C.  The Tort of “Intrusion Upon Seclusion” 
Phelps also contends that since Snyder did not physically see the 
church members at the funeral—only on the television after the event—and 
found the ―epic‖ on the internet by happenstance much later on, ―the evi-
dence shows there was no intrusion into anything—not the funeral, not 
plaintiff‘s home, not his psyche.‖69  This argument raises deeper concerns, 
specifically regarding the claim of ―intrusion upon seclusion,‖ that necessi-
tate a closer analysis of the judge‘s conclusions. 
1. The Elements of “Intrusion Upon Seclusion” in Maryland 
Since 1962, Maryland has recognized the tort of ―invasion of privacy‖ 
as a valid basis to grant relief.
70
  The ―intrusion upon seclusion‖ cause of 
action was subsequently recognized in 1969,
71
 and followed the definition 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the in-
trusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
72
 
However, by stating that ―when Snyder turned on the television . . . he 
did not ‗choose‘ to see close-ups of the Defendants‘ signs . . . but rather 
their actions intruded upon his seclusion,‖73 the judge took a dangerous 
step in expanding the doctrine.  One of the fundamental elements of this 
cause of action is that the defendant ―intentionally intrudes, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another.‖74 
  
 68. Adrian Cronauer, The Twenty-Third Charles L. Decker Lecture in Administrative and Civil Law, 
183 MIL. L. REV. 176, 179 (2005). 
 69. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 581 (D. Md. 2008).. 
 70. Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841, 845 (Md. 1962). 
 71. Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878, 883 (Md. 1969). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 73. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (emphasis added). 
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2. How “Intrusion Upon Seclusion” Applies to the Facts of Snyder v. 
Phelps 
In this case, there is no evidence that Phelps intended to intrude on 
Snyder‘s seclusion—rather than just promulgate his message to the public 
at large—by protesting at the funeral.  In fact, Phelps made sure that his 
congregation followed the statutory directive to stay at least one hundred 
feet away from the funeral, and Snyder himself testified that he was una-
ware of the protest until he later saw it on the television.
75
  If Phelps‘s de-
sire was truly to harass Snyder, he could have done so after the funeral in 
another location where the statute did not apply.  It would be difficult to 
conclude that Phelps protested in the fashion he chose because he intended 
to intrude on Snyder‘s seclusion by predicting that Snyder would happen to 
watch the protests later on the television. 
Likewise, the same reasoning the court used to support the finding of 
intrusion upon seclusion regarding ―The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. 
Matthew Snyder‖ is just as troublesome.  The judge made clear that in his 
opinion, ―[t]o publish comments on the Internet that a young man, whom 
Defendants had never met, was raised for the devil and taught to defy God 
can clearly be found to . . . have invaded [Snyder‘s] privacy during a time 
of bereavement.‖76  This might be a tenable position if Phelps had sent the 
publication directly to Snyder, or at least had published it in such a fashion 
as to make it highly probable that Snyder would come upon it.  Instead, 
Snyder found it only through an Internet search engine, and the publication 
itself was only posted on Phelps‘s website.  Once again, there is nothing to 
show that Phelps intentionally intruded on Snyder‘s seclusion.  Snyder was 
not just a passive party who had disparaging material thrust upon him; he 
actively sought out and found the publication through both a search engine 
and the act of clicking on the resulting link.  In fact, the only way Phelps 
could have found out that Snyder read the publication is when it was men-
tioned in the formal complaint filed before the lawsuit. 
Maryland caselaw reinforces the concerns previously stated.  In Bailer 
v. Erie Insurance Exchange, the Maryland Supreme Court made clear that 
intent is essential to the claim: 
[W]rongful intrusion into private affairs always involves an inten-
tional act.  It is mistaken to conclude . . . that if malice is not an 
element of invasion of privacy, neither is intent.  The tort cannot 
be committed by unintended conduct amounting merely to lack of 
  
 75. Snyder II, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 76. Id. at 581. 
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Besides illuminating this standard, Bailer illustrates the type of beha-
vior that satisfies the intentional element of intrusion upon seclusion.  The 
case was based on an action by an insurance policyholder to enjoin the 
carrier from denying financial indemnity stemming from a successful 
claim of intrusion upon seclusion against him.
78
  The underlying act was 
the filming of a nanny while she was in the shower
79—an act that was 
clearly far more intentional and intrusive that the acts of Phelps. 
Though it may seem like an extreme circumstance, the type of inten-
tional intrusion displayed in Bailer fairly resembles the typical conditions 
in which Maryland courts have found the elements of this tort satisfied.  In 
Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., the court found a genuine issue of intrusion 
upon seclusion where a former congressman brought action against a 
newspaper and two reporters that interviewed him without permission in an 
aggravating fashion at a nursing home he resided at.
80
  Another case, Pem-
berton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., deals with intrusion through investigative 
surveillance, such as where a ―detection device‖ was placed on the door of 
a motel room where the appellant was staying, as well as surveillance be-
ing maintained from the bottom of a stairwell in that same motel.
81
  In 
another situational variance, the court in Crosten v. Kamauf found a ge-
nuine issue regarding intrusion upon seclusion where the counseling center 
at the plaintiff‘s location of employment allegedly disclosed to the em-




These cases all involve intrusions that were significant and directed 
specifically at the plaintiff.  Furthermore, the seclusion that was intruded 
involved either the plaintiff‘s physical space or personal effects.  In fact, in 
Doe 2 v. Associated Press, the Fourth Circuit stated that ―[t]o be liable for 
wrongful intrusion into private affairs, a defendant must have engaged in 
conduct that resembles ‗watching, spying, prying, besetting, [or] overhear-
ing.‘‖83  It is quite a departure to extend these developed interpretations to 
an unintentional intrusion through an electronic medium, where a personal 
  
 77. Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380–81 (Md. 1997) (quoting Snakenberg v. Hartford 
Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 7 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 78. Id. at 1376. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Mitchell v. Balt. Sun Co., 883 A.2d 1008, 1023 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 81. Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
 82. Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D. Md. 1996). 
 83. Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Snakenberg v. Hartford 
Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)). 
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property right does not exist.  It is also difficult to discern whether the in-
trusion was upon Snyder‘s home or psyche.  If it was indeed the psyche 
that was intruded upon, then serious concerns are raised. 
If a valid cause of action arises every time someone sees himself refe-
renced in an opinion expressed on the Internet—where millions of people 
express their honest opinions of people every day—or on television, and 
the opinion is non-defamatory, the floodgates of litigation could burst with 
potential lawsuits.  Snyder may have a particularly vulnerable psyche, but 
the Restatement makes clear that the standard is objective, based only on 
whether ―the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.‖84  
In a world where the Internet and television have become common me-
diums of expression, and regardless of whether Snyder agreed with the 
opinions of Phelps‘s followers, it is alarming to assume that a reasonable 
person could claim his psyche‘s seclusion was intruded by actively view-
ing electronic data that was not thrust upon him. 
If it was Snyder‘s home that allegedly was ―intruded,‖ then the con-
cerns are no less serious.  It is true that in Frisby v. Schultz the Court stated 
that one‘s home holds a special status as ―the last citadel of the tired, the 
weary, and the sick.‖85  Directly implicit from this statement is the notion 
that one ―important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwil-
ling listener.‖86  However, that case involved abortion protestors who con-
gregated outside the homes of doctors and directed their opinions toward 
the doctors and their families.
87
  Phelps‘s followers were not on Snyder‘s 
lawn, nor did they in any way aim their feelings directly at him while he 
was in his home.  Just because Snyder happened to be in his home when he 
viewed the television report of the funeral as well as Phelps‘s website, does 
not mean his home was ―invaded.‖  With the possibility of viewing elec-
tronic information nearly anywhere in the world, there is no way that 
Phelps could have intentionally planned that Snyder would be at home 
when he encountered it. 
  
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
 85. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Gregory v. Chi., 394 U.S. 111, 125 
(1969)).  The Court went on to state that ―[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which 
men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important 
value.‖  Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 476. 
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3. The Importance of the “Intent” Element in “Intrusion Upon Seclu-
sion” 
The presence of the term ―intentional‖ in the language relating to an in-
trusion upon seclusion claim is essential; without it, the law would likely 
be deemed unconstitutional.  This is primarily because removal of the ―in-
tent‖ element would expand the doctrine in such a way that one could nev-
er be sure whether or not his actions were somehow intruding upon the 
seclusion of another.  This would be an overbroad hindrance to the free 
exercise of First Amendment rights. 
A regulation is considered overbroad if, in its attempts to proscribe un-
protected speech, it sweeps in a substantial amount of protected speech.
88
  
Overbreadth has been found where, for example, a statute has avoided the 
allowable restriction on ―fighting words‖ in favor of a restriction on ―op-
probrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the 
peace.‖89  Since the broad language covers more than just ―fighting words‖ 
and ―effectively ‗licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case,‘‖ 
a statute containing such language was struck down as overbroad.
90
  Fur-
thermore, if a statute is not tailored closely enough to the government in-
terest at issue, it may be found invalid.
91
  Thus, for example, where an air-
port tried to enforce a regulation that stated it was ―not open for First 
Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity‖ without any refer-
ence to those activities which could cause congestion or other problems, 
the regulation was found invalid as unconstitutional, and would be so even 
if it were applied to a nonpublic forum.
92
 
With the ―intent‖ language removed—imposing personal injury liabili-
ty for non-intentional conduct that does not result in bodily injury—the 
intrusion upon seclusion law would fall into the category of ―overbroad.‖  
The legitimate opinions and beliefs of many could easily become actiona-
ble under this tort, even when the speaker in no way desires that the opi-
nion be made known to the subject.  One hypothetical scenario related to 
this case illustrates the problem:  Even if Phelps—while in a supermar-
ket—told one of his followers that he believed Snyder‘s son was going to 
hell, and one of Snyder‘s friends overheard this from another aisle and 
reported it back to Snyder, Snyder would have a valid cause of action.  
This example is just one of a many possibilities showing how an immea-
surable amount protected free speech would effectively be proscribed. 
  
 88. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 89. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972). 
 90. Id. at 528 (quoting Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)). 
 91. Bd. of Airport Comm‘rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577 (1987). 
 92. Id. at 574–75. 
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Thus it is easy to see why the ―intent‖ element of the tort is essential to 
maintain its validity.  Since Phelps had no apparent intent to intrude upon 
Snyder‘s life—regardless of how Snyder felt—the court took a dangerous 
step towards expanding the doctrine of intrusion upon seclusion at the 
price of constitutional rights in Maryland. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This case does not appear at first glance to be a situation where First 
Amendment rights have been subjected to judicial depreciation for the sake 
of impeding a disagreeable message.  It is stated simply as the application 
of established precedents to a set of circumstances where the health and 
safety of the public has been threatened by unlawful behavior disguised as 
constitutionally protected expression.  Nevertheless, the court has in fact 
made a wide departure from its own prerequisites concerning ―intrusion 
upon seclusion,‖ and has thus perhaps taken the first step down a danger-
ous road that could end in extreme limitations placed upon First Amend-
ment rights. 
Although it may seem repugnant to some to condition the allowance of 
certain forms of expression on their effect on members of the community, 
this condition is vital for the functionality of our democracy.  But when the 
balance is tipped in favor of regulation for reasons that are highly ques-
tionable and inarticulate, the result is a great disservice upon society.  
There was a reasonable basis in Phelps for upholding the jury verdict re-
garding ―intentional infliction of emotional distress,‖ and since the defen-
dants did not dispute that there was an agreement to commit the acts at 
issue,
93
 the finding of ―civil conspiracy‖ was also valid.  However, by con-
cocting a post hoc analysis to support the verdict in favor of ―intrusion 
upon seclusion‖ that likely resulted from the jurors‘ personal distaste of 
Phelps and his message, the court significantly revised the previously ac-
cepted doctrine that was narrowly construed to avoid this type of over-
broad enforcement.  By supporting a finding of ―intentional intrusion‖ 
where a purported victim actively sought the offensive information—as 
opposed to merely being the passive target of an malicious attack—the 
court has struck an ancillary blow to Phelps‘s campaign while simulta-
neously rolling out the welcome mat for a barrage of future litigation. 
  
 93. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 581 (D. Md. 2008). 
